THE COUNTER-TERRORISM MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE US

THE COUNTER-TERRORISM MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

by Jyotirmoy Banerjee
Professor of International Relations
Jadavpur University, Calcutta

The Novelty of US Counter-terrorist Strategy

The first remarkable point to be noted in America's war against
international terrorism is that it was a remote-control war. The chief
of the Central Command, General Tommy Franks, who was in charge of
conducting the operations in Afghanistan, was 75\\% of the time sitting
in his boxy CENTCOM building overlooking Hillsborough Bay in Tampa,
Florida. His conduct of the campaign was literally antipodal, from the
other side of the planet. This was unlike his predecessor General
Norman Schwarzkopf who had moved to Saudi Arabia to direct the 1991
Persian Gulf War against Iraq. But Franks took advantage of massive
advances meanwhile in information and digital technology and other
high-tech systems to be able to do his job from home. The Florida
command post, said he, provides "24/7 situational awareness." 59 Franks
was instrumental in showing that a new way of waging war was emerging,
which was built around high-speed communications that controlled
long-range strikes using precision munitions which in turn also
depended on new information technology.

Any novelty tends to attract critique. The remote-control war was no
exception. The Air Force was particularly critical. In the view of the
critics, good ideas thousands of miles away may not turn out to be good
enough on the battlefield. The commander should be physically present
near the theatre of operations, at least to boost the morale of
combatants. Also, they point out, Franks could have used the same
communications system from Southwest Asia to stay in touch with DOD and
CENTCOM in the USA.

Reconnaissance drones and other gadgets enabled General Franks to watch
battle on screens at home which was not possible ten years ago. As a
Colonel put it, "This isn't a bayonet charge up a hill." Napoleon had
stood on a hill at Rossomme and directed his corps, while Wellington
stood on the opposite St. Jean hill to direct his battalions. But "the
days when the strategic-level commander fought battles with his own
eyes are gone," he added.1

A second novelty was the deployment of small US special forces teams on
the ground in Afghanistan. While the use of these forces was straight
from the doctrine of unconventional warfare, their wholesale
integration into the air war was absolutely unique. They were inserted
into Afghanistan and started operating from around 20 October night.
Hundreds of Army Rangers were paradropped onto a military airfield
about 80 miles (130 km) south of Kandahar while a helicopter gunship
raid hit a Taliban compound at the edge of the city. Two Green Beret
units also landed simultaneously in the north from helicopters. One
team joined with Uzbek chief Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Northern Alliance
commander near Mazar-i-Sharif, that night, and the other with the Tajik
commander Muhammad Fahim Khan, who succeeded the slain Massoud and
whose forces were loosely arrayed against the Taliban in the direction
of Kabul. The US special forces, called A Teams consisting of a dozen
handpicked troops, operate secretively and possess special arsenal like
night-vision gear and laser range-finders that can locate targets miles
away. They transformed the Northern Alliance from little more than an
ill-equipped mob into a capable fighting force in just three weeks. The
Alliance henceforth was able to take on the Taliban forces, damaged as
the latter were by intense and incessant US precision bombing, and even
rout them.

The arrival of the special forces changed the war picture in
Afghanistan. There was no need for big, conventional battles with a
large number of US troops being fielded. Hitherto DOD thinking was to
airlift big ground force units to the battle zone; alternatively, to
rely mainly on the native opposing forces. If the special forces
operations had not succeeded, then the war might have witnessed many
strikes by relatively large forces of the Rangers and other infantry
units. In a final push the Marines were to seize the international
airport near Kandahar. But the A Teams precluded the need for bigger US
engagements on land. Under steadily increasing pressure from the A
Teams the Taliban suddenly collapsed. On 8 February 2002 Taliban's
Foreign Minister Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil surrendered. As of
mid-February more than fifteen more top Taliban leaders, including
ex-cabinet members except the absconding Mullah Omar, were expected to
follow suit.2 Nobody could foresee that. The lion's share of the credit
for this dramatic turn of events goes to the special forces as much as
the other key elements used by the USA.The lessons from Afghanistan are
now being applied in the Philippines. Special forces have been sent
there to advise and assist Manila's army in fighting terrorists.

A third novelty was the close cooperation between special operations
forces on the ground and the air force.

'Spec Ops' and JDAMS

Small teams of US 'spec ops' or special operation forces infiltrated
into Afghanistan and sent bursts of digitalised target coordinates to
orbiting bombers overhead--from laptops. The miniaturised mobile
hi-tech devices turned the tables in America's favour. Within minutes
the bombers responded. B-52s, for example, unleashed high-precision,
1-ton Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) fitted out with
satellite-guidance systems and navigational fins on the target spotted
by 'spec ops' teams. Unique in this counter-terrorist war was the high
degree of coordination achieved between the small US teams on the
ground and the high-performance bombers overhead which eliminated not
only targets but also limited collateral damage to civilians. After
all, the US was fighting the elusive terrorists hiding among innocent
civilians. It was an enormous task finding needles in the haystack.
While Afghan opposition forces and even Russia's military and secret
service, the FSB, often provided valuable HUMINT or human intelligence
on the Taliban and al Qaeda, it was US technology and novel strategy
which clinched the issue.

The three key US assets were, first, very long-range B-2 and B-52
bombers (the latter, though vintage, were retrofitted with JDAMs and
other hi-tech gadgets), digital communications "underpinning the
synergy of U.S.forces", and a brand new weapon, the Predator drones.3
The small number of roving spec ops teams on the ground and
globe-girdling bombers worked so effectively that they obviated the
need for either large ground or air formations of a classic
conventional war. It also cut the need for heavy US reliance on nearby
military bases. Of course, the Taliban and al Qaeda were poorly
equipped for taking on a superpower, and they particularly lacked in
effective anti-aircraft defence. So, in other theatres the US may have
to face greater 'access-denial threats'. Nevertheless, these unique
features of the Afghanistan campaign have ushered in a new type of
warfare. A paradigm shift seems to have taken place in the realm of US
warfighting doctrine. Over 70\\% of the bombs dropped in Afghanistan
were precision-guided munitions (PGMs), mostly JDAMs. In contrast,
30\\% were PGMs in Kosovo, and only 10\\% in the Gulf War.4

Another novelty, bordering on the humourous, was that the same laptops
signalled the hovering aircraft overhead to drop not only bombs but
also hay, saddles and other cavalry support for the Northern Alliance
forces. The combination of 19th. century cavalry charge and 21st.
century hi-tech was surely unprecedented in the history of
warfare!

The highly sophisticated and globe-girdling digital communication
network used by the USA proved decisive in this war. It is well known
that the super-secret National Security Agency (NSA) has the ability to
eavesdrop on all and sundry wireless communication, anywhere. The
hush-hush Echelon system of the USA, the existence of which even
America's European allies took long to discover and the European
Parliament subsequently confirmed, can pick up even local
communications like radio taxi, cell phone and other calls and emails.5
Osama, aware of some of these US eavesdropping capabilities, reportedly
adopted the outdated, but effective, method of dispensing with his cell
phones and sending encrypted messages on compact discs on horseback,
dubbed the 'pony express'. It should be mentioned in this connection
that with all of America's sophisticated technology, it will be
difficult to trace all of illegal money transactions by the terrorists
since part of that process moves through the age-old, primitive yet
highly effective 'hawala' (Arabic for word of mouth) system based on
trust that can operate internationally without leaving any tangible
records.

The three critical components of long-range bombers equipped with PGMs,
hi-tech communications and drones have paved the way for a new method
of long-range US power projection. Their combination enabled the US to
deliver accurate and sustained firepower which proved to be devastating
for those at the receiving end. The Taliban and al Qaeda's personal
courage and the human ability and will to fight counted for little
before these precision, deathspewing machines. As General John Jumper,
the Chief of Staff of USAF pointed out, the spec ops used satellites to
get target coordinates to circling pilots. This enabled the USAF to cut
response time to less than 20 minutes between the moment a Taliban
target was spotted and its destruction.6

The Global Positioning System 7

That situation created another novelty. The large, 8-jet-engined B-52s,
traditionally playing the role of strategic bomber, switched role and
played close tactical, ground support role hitherto left to short-range
combat aircraft. Further, since the B-52s used satellite guidance for
their JDAM weapons, which radically improved accuracy and devastation,
there was no need for a large number of them flying sorties over
Afghanistan. Some sorties had only a pair of bombers. The small number
of aircraft eased repeated midair refuelling. So, bombers could operate
with relative ease over Afghanistan from their far away base in Diego
Garcia.

Before Afghanistan the DOD had sidelined spec ops out of the historic
resentment of the conventional military against any challenge to their
doctrine favouring war with big armoured brigades. But now, special
forces--and special operations forces--have come into their own. They
are the future spearheads against global terrorism. They enable the US
new flexibility and mobility, the ability to share battlefield
information in almost real-time, thanks to the satellite network of the
Global Positioning System (GPS). Military GPS is highly accurate,
within a few yards, tells the infantryman where he is, and rapidly
provides target coordinates to satellites which then guide smart bombs
accurately on to the target regardless of weather conditions. This
precision-bombing ability which can keep up with mobile forces enabled
US air power to clear the way for the Northern Alliance against the
Taliban. A missile operating with the GPS system can approach the
target from any direction and can even make deceptive manoeuvers in
approach so as to confuse enemy ant-aircraft defence. The GPS digital
network was key to binding cutting-edge air power and small ground
teams.

Below is a representative, not exhaustive, list of other critical tools
which the US used to win this war.

The RQ-1 Predator Drone

The Predator, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) made its combat debut in
Afghanistan.

The $ 3 million drone is equipped with high-resolution video cameras,
radar and infra-red sensors to feed live information on ground
conditions back to friendly troops. The Taliban may have shot down one
on 22 September. It provides invaluable 'eye in the sky' to track
individual terrorists as well as bigger enemy formations and other
elusive targets. If armed with Hellfire missiles, one under each wing
measuring 20 feet (6 meters), it then becomes an unmanned aerial combat
vehicle (UCAV), adding attack capability to its primary mission of a
reconnaissance aircraft. On one occasion a Predator transmitted
pictures of an enemy night convoy stopping at a hotel. Based on that
information nearby F-15 combat jets attacked the building. The hovering
Predator then tracked down fleeing vehicles and destroyed them with its
own Hellfire missiles, apparently before the victims realised they were
being followed.8

This was the first time ever in the annals of warfare that a drone
attacked a target after following it with its own 'eyes' and without
the suicidal dive of the German V-1 drones in World War II. This was
yet another novelty in the US counter-terror war effort. Hitherto the
US Air Force had kept them aside fearing the loss of importance of its
pilots, but now that they have proven their worth they are expected to
play a key role in future wars. Their additional advantage lies in the
fact that no one has to worry about a pilot's life or send search and
rescue missions since no human life is at stake with them. These drones
can also be used discreetly from neighbouring states and are able to
land in a few hundred yards of improvised runway.

THE BOMBERS

The B-1 Lancer is a long-range strategic bomber that can perform many
missions besides. It can fly intercontinental missions without
refuelling and penetrate sophisticated enemy defence. It is expensive
at over $200 million apiece, and early crashes raised a controversy
over it. It flies at Mach 1.2 at sea level, ceiling: over 30,000 feet,
maximum takeoff weight (MTW): 190,000 lbs.

The B-2 Spirit stealth bomber made its debut in Kosovo. Due to its
'stealth' characteristics it gives off insignificant 'signature' on
enemy radar. Flies from bases in the US with mid-air refuelling. There
are 21 B-2s in active service. Speed: high subsonic, ceiling: 50,000
feet, MTW: 336,500 lbs.

The B-52 Stratofortress is a long-range heavy bomber of the Vietnam war
vintage but periodically upgraded. It has worldwide precision
navigational capability. Speed: high subsonic. Ceiling: up to 50,000
feet, MTW: 488,000 lbs. Dropped hi-tech JDAM ordnance in
Afghanistan.

FIGHTER-BOMBERS

F-14 Tomcat is a US Navy, carrier-borne fighter-bomber,the pride of the
navy. Speed: Mach 2 plus, MTW: 72,900 lbs. Carries an assortment of
Phoenix, Sidewinder and Sparrow missiles. It is a bit too heavy which
affects its manoeuverability as a fighter.

F/A-18 Hornet is a carrier-borne all-weather, multirole light fighter
and attack aircraft. Can carry out interdiction and close air support
too. Speed: Mach 1.7 plus, ceiling: 50,000 feet plus, MTW: 51,900
lbs.

F-15 Eagle is the USAF's manoeuverable, tactical fighter. Speed: 1,875
mph (Mach 2.5 plus at sea level), ceiling: 65,000 feet, MTW: C/D models
68,000 lbs.

F-16 Falcon is the USAF's compact, multirole fighter, highly
manoeuverable, proven in air-to-air and air-to-surface attacks.
Relatively low cost. With the Russian MiG-29 it has been the world's
premier fighter aircraft. Speed: 1,500 mph (Mach 2 at altitude),
ceiling: above 50,000 feet, MTW: 37,500 lbs.

AIRCRAFT-CARRIERS

There are eight of them. The carriers are still the queen of the fleet
though the Tomahawk cruise missile has somewhat diminished its role of
launching aircraft like the Tomcat and the Hornet. The Nimitz class is
the most advanced of all classes of carriers, is powered by two nuclear
reactors and has four shafts. Length: 1,092 feet, flight deck width:
252 feet, beam: 134 feet, displacement: about 97,000 tons full load,
air wing: 85 assorted aircraft, unit cost: about $4.5 billion each.
5,000 people man the carriers. The electricity consumption of a carrier
can supply a small town. Each carrier heads a battle group(CVBG)
consisting of surface combatants and submarines.

The Bombs

GBU-28 Bunker-Buster

Designed during the 1991 Gulf War using recycled 8-inch heavy gun
barrels to bust underground bunkers. Guided by computer, the bomb seeks
and follows a laser beam, penetrates six meters of rock or thirty
meters of soil, then explodes 300 kg. of high explosive in the bunker
or cave beneath. The laser guidance is provided by special operations
teams who 'paint' the target with a burst of coded laser energy from
within 300 meters of it. So, the special forces act as forward air
controllers. The target marker is about the size of a pair of
binoculars and highlights the target as the attacking bomber
approaches. Once released near the target, the bomb's laser detector
finds the reflected energy. A computer then guides the GBU 28 on to its
target.

BLU-82 Daisy Cutter

Billed as the world' biggest conventional bomb, it has the size of a
small car and incinerates everything within 600 meters. It was used in
Vietnam and the Gulf War and produces great psychological shock. The
bomb itself is a large steel container (6 mm plate) packing 5,700 kg.
of explosive 'slurry', i.e., a mix of ammonium nitrate and aluminium
powder varieties. Once released, this mixes with the air to form fine
mist. When ignited, a huge explosion incnerates the entire area within
600 meters but leaves little or no crater. It is meant to clear jungle
for helicopters to land. A C-130 cargo plane drops it from its rear by
means of a trolley from at least 6,000 feet (1,800 meters) above ground
to avoid shock wave. The pressure-sensitive fuse of the BLU-82
detonates just above ground releasing the deadly mist.

Cruise Missile (Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile, TLAM)

It is a subsonic, low-flying drone fitted out with the TERCOM or
terrain-comparison system. This means it has a miniaturised map of its
flight route lodged in its computer brain. Its TV eyes take in the
ground picture below and around it while it is flying. The picture thus
obtained is automatically compared with the route map in its 'memory',
and deviations corrected. This makes the relatively cheap cruise
missile a highly accurate weapon. It is versatile and can be launched
from air-, land-, sea- and undersea platforms.

THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES/COMMANDOS

These are numerous within the US armed forces. The units which likely
participated in the Afghan anti-terrorist war are briefly described
below.

Green Berets (US Army)

Airborne Special Forces, also trains guerrillas in other states. Each
member must be able to speak a foreign language. Its variety of
missions include unconventional warfare, reconnaissance, direct action,
counter-terrorism.

The Rangers (US Army)

They are the spearhead of the army's special operations forces. Can
deploy by land, air and sea, worldwide, at short notice. Specialise in
infantry assault, night combat and airfield seizure. They are supported
by the 160th. Special Operations Aviation Regiment, better known as
'Night Stalkers', using latest aircraft and equipment to assist special
operations forces from the air.

Delta Force

A hush-hush unit, billed as elite special ops. unit and drawn from all
the military branches. It was formed after a spate of terrorist attacks
in the 1970s. Like the US Navy SEALs, several allied special operations
forces, possibly the British SAS, the German GSG 9, and the Israeli and
French special ops. forces influenced it. Much of its capabilities is
classified. One speciality is hostage rescue.

The Special Air Service (SAS, British special forces) Regiment

SAS belongs to the British Army. Formed in 1941, its motto is: "Who
dares, wins." Built to fight in north African desert behind German
lines, the regiment was later deployed for anti-terrorist operations
against the IRA in North Ireland. A publicity-shy unit, it liberated
the Iranian embassy in London in May 1980 from 6 gunmen. Only about 10
out of an average 125 applicants are selected. The selected candidate
receives the SAS beret and the famous winged dagger beret badge which
represents the Damocles' sword.

4th.Psyops (psycological operations) Group

Based in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, this unit was reportedly planning
to scatter leaflets and use transistor radios to encourage defection
among the Taliban and also inform civilian Afghans of US intentions.
Was to offer rewards for information on Osama. EC-130 Commando Solo
aircraft was used to broadcast instructions to Afghan civilians on what
to do when US troops arrived.

CONCLUSION

DOD is mandated to submit a review of its military strategy to Congress
every four years. The latest incorporates the lessons leant from the 11
September 2001 terrorist attack.9

Its central recommendation elevates homeland defence to the status of
highest priority. The murkiness that was created by the 'threat blank'
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the somewhat
half-hearted preparation from the 1980s for low-intensity conflict,
which the military looked upon it with a jaundiced view since it cut
into their first love, i.e., large conventional forces, have all been
resolved following 11 September 2001 and the US counter-terrorist
retaliation beginning next month. The declared goal of the US that it
will weed out international terrorism regardless of the country it
operates from will surely keep the DOD busy for an indefinite number of
years. The overriding goal of countering international terrorism will
singificantly change the configuration and mission of the US armed
forces.

The military review stresses the need for more strategic lift
capability, naval presence and combat aircraft along the Indian Ocean,
the Persian Gulf and the Pacific rim. Much of this process was already
underway since the 11 September terrorist attack. The question that is
likely to engage the attention of the US military and the
administratiion is how best to spend the massive defence budget
approved by Congress for the new, and in many senses, unique, war
against terrorism. The review also suggests that DOD maintain overseas
bases to deter aggression and build up forces capable of conducting a
limited number of small-scale operations.

A departure is also noticeable in the current review. Past reviews had
urged the need for US military capability to fight two wars
simultaneously. This was to dissuade a potential aggressor from
attacking in a different theatre while the US was preoccupied with a
war far away. The current view, however, is that the US should be
prepared to fight two regional wars but with a difference: win in one
while halting the enemy in the other theatre. One of these conflicts
could be "global terrorism" as opposed to a purely regional
campaign.

The US counter-terrorist-cum-military victory in Afghanistan, seen in a
broader perspective, is just the first round. Many questions now
arise--without sure answers. What about the future stability in
Afghanistan? Already reports have poured in that some warlords have
reverted to tradition there and started fighting among themselves.
Then, US presence in Southwest Asia is seen with suspicion by several
powers, including Russia, Iran and China. A strong incentive for the US
to linger on in the region is the potentially highly exploitable oil
and natural gas reserves of Central Asia. Steady and assured supplies
through pipelines from there to the wider world would depend on peace
and stability in the entire region, including Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Further, will the fundamentalists lie low forever? Will there be a
resurgence of terrorism if the USA were to go home, leaving Afghanistan
and its neighbours to sort out a whole variety of vexing problems for
themselves? Traditionally, Iran, Russia and Pakistan have had axes to
grind in Afghanistan; India, too, wants to make sure that a friendly
government remains in power in Kabul. While India had supported the
Rabbani government ousted by the Taliban in 1996, Islamabad had backed
the latter which was, after all, its own creation. Indeed, Islamabad
was the only country out of the grand total of three which had
maintained an embassy in Taliban-ruled Kabul till the very last moment.
The other two, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, had cut off diplomatic
relations following the commencement of hostilities by the US. So,
along with efforts at nation-building in that country, the interested
players are likely to meddle in its political affairs, thereby
complicating the situation in and around Afghanistan.10

It is beyond the scope of this essay to deal with the multiple aspects
of the fallout from the USA's Afghan war. It should nevertheless be
mentioned that India has made good use of the opportunity at this
writing (early February 2002) provided by the determined
counter-terrorist operations launched by the Bush administration.
Paradoxically, Islamabad paved the way for India's opportunity by
tolerating or actively abetting the anti-Indian jihadis operating from
its soil. The attacks on the Kashmir Assembly, shortly followed by that
on India's Parliament itself, served to bolster the rationale behind
India flexing its muscles at the Pakistani border. The Indian
government played its cards well. New Delhi took a leaf from US
strategist Thomas C. Schelling's 'rocking-the-boat' strategy to
escalate tension. It declared that the idea of 'hot pursuit' of the
border-crossing terrorists and hitting their sanctuaries in Pakistan
could not be ruled out after these obnoxious acts, not to speak of the
almost daily slaughter of innocent civilians, particularly in the state
of Jammu &; Kashmir. During the Kargil operation in 1999 India had
exercised commendable self-restraint by not chasing the infiltrators
back to the Pakistani side of the border. But after the West,
particularly the US, got the 'wake up' call on 11 September and
realised that they were on the same boat as India vis-?-vis global
terrorism, they were not overly concerned about the niceties of
International Law in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Spearheaded by the USA,
the West fell in line to adapt their domestic laws, policies and
related operations, got a few international resolutions together, and
geared up to nab or 'smoke out' the terrorists. The Bush Doctrine had
little sensitivity to spare for the sovereignty of the country where
they had their hideouts. Armitage's "non-negotiable" ultimatum to
Pakistan, mentioned above, is a representative sampler. So, if the
world leader could be aggressive in pursuing its goal of rooting out
international terrorism, why could not India be half as much? It was
clear that al Qaeda was as much behind the attacks in the USA as in
Kashmir. Russian President Vladimir Putin pointed to the common root of
international terrorism that was active in breakaway Chechnya.
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and even China, which has a substantial Muslim
population in its western province of Xinjiang and has also tasted
terrorism, were all concerned about the cancerous spread of Islamic
radicalism from neighbouring Afghanistan under the Taliban.

India's troop mobilisation and the tough statements emerging from its
political and military leaders as well as another Agni missile test in
January, followed by a successful cryogenic rocket test in February,
came amidst the border tension. It looked like a fourth round of
Indo-Pak war was in the offing. India's show of belligerence, countered
equally strongly by Islamabad, forced Washington to pressure Musharraf
again in December, as we have noted. It now wanted the Pakistani
dictator to take effective measures to stop exporting terrorism and
publicly declare as much. New Delhi could draw satisfaction that the
Bush administration, having itself banned them, specifically demanded a
Pakistani ban on the Lashkar and Jaish outfits operating against India.
India's show of force could hardly be admonished after the attempt on
its Parliament. Its military deployment near the Pakistani border
promised to upset America's apple-cart in the region. According to The
Washington Post of 28 December (p.A01), the US military was using
one-third of Pakistan's air space apart from using its air bases;
besides the 60,000 Pakistani troops guarding the 1,400-mile Afghan
border in the rugged, mountainous terrain to help the US intercept al
Qaeda fighters, another 35,000 were guarding US troops and bases. If
Islamabad had to shift these troops and take back its air space and
some of the bases to face an Indian threat, then these shifts in
Islamabad's resources themselves would make US objectives in the region
infinitely more complicated, not to speak of a war. So, the US leaned
again on Musharraf to placate New Delhi. The Pakistani President had no
alternative left other than to oblige.

It may be mentioned here in passing that Israel too took full advantage
of the situation created by US anti-terrorist crusade to take drastic
action against its own terrorists hailing from Palestinian radicals.
Despite intermittent attempts by the US and other West European
countries to urge restraint on Tel Aviv and the Palestinian Authority,
hostilities continued into February. The Economist.com reported on 11
February 2002 that Palestinian radicals struck at south Israeli targets
with their new Kassem missiles from the Gaza Strip, thereby inviting
Israeli warplanes counter-attack from the air. But Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon has to balance his strikes against the US concern for a
Palestinian uprising if pressed too far. His dilemma is not wholly
unlike the Indian Premier's who also has to balance macho acts against
Pakistan-based terrorists against the possibility of Musharraf being
suddenly ousted by fundamentalists, thereby upsetting both India's, and
America's, positions in the South/Southwest Asian region.

But to revert to US-Pakistani relations. We have already noted
Musharraf singing an amazingly different tune on 12 January, coming
down especially hard on the fundamentalists and militants of his
country. Henry Kissinger called his speech "revolutionary". Musharraf
vowed that he would not permit the use of Pakistani territory for
spreading terrorism even though he did not budge from his frozen stand
as self-appointed champion of Kashmiri rights. After all, he could not
afford to appear to buckle under what everyone knew to be Indian
pressure. The tenor of his speech might well have been scripted in
Washington, much to the listening pleasure of New Delhi.

While both the latter capitals were outwardly pleased, India was not to
be shaken from its resolve. It's action, not mere words, by which we
are going to measure Pakistan's policy, said the Vajpayee government in
effect. Colin Powell asserted the same though perhaps with a shade of
icing on it. The Indian armed forces remained in February at their
battle stations near the Pakistani border, on alert. Now the ball is in
Pakistan's court, to prove its words by credible deeds. India will
stand down only if Pakistan can satisfy it by stopping all cross-border
terrorism. The US and the West can have little against India's apparent
jingoistic posture. After all, the US and its allies undertook such
massive military and other action against Afghanistan on very similar
grounds! New Delhi was not doing anything which Washington was not
doing. So, New Delhi has leveraged US power and objectives in Southwest
Asia to achieve its own goals and has clearly emerged one-up on
Islamabad.

Let us close with an apt quote:11

Sectarianism, bigotry, and its horrible descendant, fanaticism, have
long possessed this beautiful earth. They have filled the earth with
violence, drenched it often and often with human blood, destroyed
civilisation, and sent whole nations in despair. ?But their time is
come; (it is to be hoped that the first bomb which exploded against the
terrorists in Afghanistan on the night of 7 October) may be the
death-knell of all fanaticism?.

Sounds straight from the Pentagon, State Department or White House? No,
the quote is from Chicago. The date: 11 September 1893. The venue:
World's Parliament of Religions. The speaker: Swami Vivekananda.

----------------------------------------------------

NOTES
N.B. Numerous online sources describe the USA's war effort, including
its impressive military machine. Among the present author's favourites
are: CNN warroom, ABC, MSNBC, NYT, The Washington Post, FAS.org., US
Air Force, and the author's own website, JBONLINE
(http://clix.to/joyban), which hotlinks to all these and more strategic
sites and satellite-updated international news. JBONLINE also offers
hotlink to the online catalogue of the American Center library in
Kolkata.
4.
5. 1. Thomas E. Ricks, "A War That is Commanded at a Distance", The
Washington Post.com, 27 Dec.2001.
6. 2. There is a difference between the terms 'special forces' and
'special operations forces' in military cirlces. The former means only
the US Army's unconventional forces called Green Berets, while the
latter includes unconventional units in all branches of the military.
Thom Shanker, NYT Service, "Special Forces Success Reshapes War
Doctrine", in International Herald Tribune (IHT) online, 22 Jan. 2002.
On the Taliban surrender, TOI, Calcutta, 13 Feb.2002, p.9.
7. 3..Joseph Fitchett, "Hi-Tech Weapons Change the Dynamics And the
scope of Battle", IHT online, 28 Dec.2001. On Russia's Afghanistan
veterans providing intelligence on Afghan cave networks and other
issues, MSNBC.com, 25 Nov. 2001.
8. 4..Ibid.
9. 5..Discovery TV with BBC, 21 Sept. 2001, 9-11 pm. However,
speculation in the Russian press credited Osama and his network with
having penetrated the codes of the White House and even the NSA. Their
'steganography' can reportedly penetrate electronic surveillance
systems by concealing messages in apparently harmless music or porno
files. Sergei Borisov, "Terrorists knew White House Secret Codes",
Pravda.ru, 25 Sept.2001.
10. 6..Fitchett, op.cit.
11. 7..Fitchett, ibid.; "War in Afghanistan. Air Surveillance" The
Guardian.com. MSNBC/USAF online detail the US weapons systems described
below; CNN.com on 'special operations' forces in "War Against Terror";
Thomas E. Ricks, Vernon Lobe, "Special forces open ground campaign",
The Washington Post.com, 19 Oct. 2001; Center for Defense Information
(CDI) online, "Forces in Play" (Terrorism project).
12. 8..Fitchett, op.cit.
13. 9.NYT.com, 2 Oct. 2001.
14. 10.Yahoo Alerts-News quoted Reuters on 3 Feb. 2002 to state that
the US accused Iran in the World Economic Forum on 2 Feb. of supporting
a warlord in Afghanistan, an accusation rejected by Tehran.
15. 11.Advaita Ashrama, Selections from the Complete Works of Swami
Vivekananda, Calcutta, July 2001, p.2. Paraphrasing in parentheses is
by the present author.
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